

and climate change will intensify the battle for water. What are these statements adding up to? Mody does not have an answer. Here is an answer.

Most of India (except the coasts and water-rich Kerala) has an arid tropical monsoon climate, which means acute seasonal shortages of water everywhere and perennial scarcity in some areas. Neither intensive agriculture nor urbanization is possible without a serious attempt to meet that condition. India did meet it head-on. To rehabilitate Nehru, his “temples” of modernization included more than a thousand gigantic dams (with reservoirs) built in the semiarid Deccan Plateau. That technology proved politically and ecologically unsustainable. But the alternatives were no better. Mody’s frequent India–Japan comparison distracts from independent India’s specific developmental challenges. A temperate monsoon and water-rich Japan did not have this problem to solve. The challenge was a tropical one. India should be compared with the Sahel or the Horn of Africa, not Japan, and should fare well in that comparison.

Fundamentally, Mody’s claim is right. India *is* broken. It offers a poor deal to its working-age population, few good jobs and little welfare. A humanitarian crisis for migrant workers shortly after COVID-19 broke out was a brutal reminder of the condition. The book’s message is stark and demands attention. That it is a highly readable account of India’s development enhances the appeal.

Tirthankar Roy

*London School of Economics and Political Science
London, UK*

Settling for Less: Why States Colonize and Why They Stop by Lachlan McNamee, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2023, xi + 240 pp.

West Papua, a half island in East Indonesia, was liberated from the Dutch colonial rule and transferred to Indonesia in 1963. Since then, Indonesia had actively sent numerous settlers to the island, slaughtered Papua indigenes, and fought separatists—policies that drastically changed West Papua’s demographic scene, and Papuans even became minorities in coastal areas. Meanwhile, the other side of the island saw similar but failed attempts by Australia. Although Australia tried to send settlers to East Papua, only a few were interested in settling the remote islands. Finally, in 1975, the Australian government ceased colonization and granted Papua New Guinea its independence.

The contrastive trajectories in West and East Papua raise questions on the conditions under which states forcefully colonize territories and their reasons for abandoning them. Lachlan McNamee, in his book *Settling for Less*, provides a political and economic explanation for this. His empirical analysis is uniquely characterized by a “shamelessly interdisciplinary approach” (p. 24), which includes historical, economic, and political science approaches.

In Chapter 2, McNamee argues that the interests of potential settlers (e.g., Indonesians) and metropolises (e.g., the Indonesian government) shaped the success or failure of settler colonialism. Settlers are motivated by economic incentives. Whereas economic desperation

in a home country can “push” them toward new frontiers, economic prosperity in colonies, such as fertile lands and natural resources, can also “pull” them toward colonies. In contrast, metropolises are more concerned about security. By colonizing lands, they can substitute their own “loyal” ethnicities with native “rebellious” ones and signal their commitment to foreign competitors. Thus, metropolises advocate colonization when they perceive that their country’s territorial integrity is being threatened internally or externally.

An interesting corollary of the theory is that economic development diminishes a country’s power to colonize. As a country shifts from low-income agrarian economies to industrial societies, people become less willing to move to frontier lands. As a result, despite the metropolises’ willingness to colonize for security reasons, they may experience difficulty in finding a sufficient number of settlers. Thus, rather counterintuitively, it is the developing countries with internal and external threats that are the most aggressive at pursuing colonization.

In Chapter 3, McNamee investigates Indonesia’s colonization of West Papua to illustrate these dynamics. Consistent with this theory, an internal security threat—the failed Papuan uprising in 1984—triggered a large-scale migration of Indonesians to West Papua. Moreover, the migration was concentrated on the border of Papua New Guinea and mining sites, which posed an external security threat and provided economic prosperity, respectively. To support these claims, McNamee uses difference-in-differences (DiD) by using temporal (the failed 1984 uprising and the opening of the Grasberg mine in 1990) and spatial variations (border and mining areas).

In Chapter 4, McNamee shifts the focus toward Australia’s failed colonization attempt of East Papua, which was mostly due to high transportation costs, and the Northern Territory. With limited economic prosperity, neither the settlers nor the government found a pressing need to finance transportation and actively colonize East Papua. Although the situation in the Northern Territory was slightly different, the government eventually failed to colonize those lands as well. The rise of Japan and its control over New Guinea during World War II raised substantial security concerns, and by 1937, the Australian government had spent £15 billion for colonizing the Northern Territory. However, only a few people settled. Therefore, this case of Australia demonstrates the core role of economic factors; the metropole’s security concern is insufficient for colonization and must be accompanied with economic incentives for settlers.

In Chapter 5, McNamee and his coauthor, Anna Zhang, extend their analysis to China’s colonization of Xinjiang during the Sino-Soviet split in 1959–82. Using a DiD design similar to that in Chapter 3, they demonstrate that the split substantially increased the Han population and decreased the Russian population in the border areas. Contrary to common understanding, it did not change the Kyrgyz, Kazakh, or Uyghur populations, which did not pose any security concerns at the time. A similar change was observed in the Soviet, where the Sino-Soviet split substituted the Russian population for the Chinese population in the areas bordering China. These results support McNamee’s claim that security threats incentivize a government to colonize its frontiers.

In Chapter 6, McNamee investigates the more recent changes in Xinjiang. Although the perceived threat of Islamist insurgency has reinvigorated China’s colonization efforts since 1990, McNamee claims that the “Chinese state has consistently sought and *failed* to colonize Xinjiang” (p. 115) because an increasing number of people move to the prosperous eastern

coasts (e.g., Shanghai) instead of Xinjiang. While the oil discovery in Luntai increased Han settlement, the rest of southern Xinjiang has not experienced significant demographic shifts despite the government's massive investment. These results are consistent with McNamee's other tenet that economic development diminishes a government's power to colonize.

In Chapter 7, McNamee examines the generalizability of his arguments by analyzing a cross-national panel from 1980 to 2003. The results are consistent with the above findings, and settler colonialism and ethnic cleansing are correlated with lower GDP per capita, proximity to international conflicts over territories, internal rebellion, and the presence of oil deposits. Although such analysis is correlational, its results suggest that the theory may be applied to a broader set of countries. The book concludes with comments on China's colonization of Xinjiang and the Israeli settlement of Gaza.

Settling for Less offers a modern and multidisciplinary analysis of settler colonialism. Despite its simplicity, this theory can explain patterns in many regions: New Guinea, Xinjiang, and even cross-national variations. The empirical analyses include a modern econometric approach (i.e., DiD), qualitative case studies, and archival works. The book also cites a number of historical examples to illustrate its theoretical argument, such as the Greek colonization of Asia under Alexander the Great. Overall, *Settling for Less* provides the most comprehensive analysis of settler colonialism.

However, a few caveats are present. First, this book examines *settler* colonialism, which is only an aspect of colonialism. The British Empire, for instance, indirectly ruled India without any substantial demographic changes. As nonsettler colonialism is beyond the scope of this book, readers should not expect it to answer every question on colonialism. Second, the book provides only partial explanations of settler colonialism; the author does not intend to claim that it is solely determined by geopolitical and economic factors. The aim is to propose a new political and economic explanation of settler colonialism and illustrate that it is more consistent with historical records than previous analyses. Finally, the interpretation of quantitative analyses sometimes requires caution. Predictors are endogenous to the outcome variable; for instance, domestic rebellion and even mining opportunities depend on underlying demographic shifts, and the DiD is not well suited for addressing reverse causality. Nevertheless, this book is a crystallization of different approaches across disciplines and is highly recommended for readers interested in the political economy of settler colonialism.

Kyosuke Kikuta
Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO
Chiba, Japan

The Urbanization of People: The Politics of Development, Labor Markets, and Schooling in the Chinese City by Eli Friedman, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 2022, xiv + 337 pp.

This is a book review that is almost a year late. I feel a deep sense of guilt for the editor's patient waiting, and at the same time, I am frustrated by the endless adjustments I