(1) they face a resource disadvantage relative to other candidates, or (2) when the electoral or economic costs associated with electoral malfeasance rises. These conditions explain political alignments in favor of reform both in countries with stable party competition (Britain and Belgium) as well as in countries with dominant parties (Germany and France). For the latter set of cases, elite splits are particularly important in creating new coalitions in favor of reform. These splits produce fragmentation, and new factions may cooperate with one another against corrupt incumbents, or may differentiate themselves programmatically—rather than rely on illicit tactics (p. 47). Legislators are more likely to support reform when they lack access to resources, or when they face electoral costs from voters or members of opposing parties who object to corruption.

Mares's analysis proceeds with chapters devoted to each type of reform. This deeply historical account first describes the extent and variety of electoral malfeasance across the four cases—for example, treating and vote buying were prevalent in Britain, while misuse of state resources was widespread in Germany. It then elucidates the theory across the cases. Occasionally, reforms arose because parties were relatively similar in their access to resources, and the costs of reform were low. But in the cases of Germany and France, the economic conditions within districts, the strategic considerations in election runoffs, and new factions and parties campaigning on programmatic promises all facilitated coalitions in favor of reforms. Mares's quantitative analysis uses an impressive dataset on the French Third Republic, which includes personal attributes of legislators (partisanship, resources), campaign platforms, district characteristics (party competition, economic development, electoral brokerage), and votes on reform proposals. This allows her to go beyond structural factors, and to test competing hypotheses against one another to show how strategic electoral considerations change the reform landscape.

While Mares's historical analysis is meticulously detailed, providing us with an account of the people and issues at the heart of reform debates, it would have been interesting to hear more about some of the broader political developments of the era. For example, her argument about access to state resources echoes Martin Shefter ("Party and Patronage: Germany, England, and Italy," *Politics & Society*, 7(4), 1977; *Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience*, 1994), who posited that the timing of bureaucratic development and franchise extension explained whether parties relied on patronage. Where the state is protected by a "coalition for bureaucratic autonomy" prior to suffrage expansion, parties will be more likely to develop policy-based campaigns. Shefter also theorized that outsider parties, lacking access to state resources, will rely on programmatic appeals—and in doing so, will pressure patronage-dependent parties to adapt. This aligns with Mares's findings about reform coalitions reflecting "extremes against the center" (pp. 65, 205), and with politicians campaigning on programmatic appeals facing cross-pressures when they also used illicit strategies.

In her conclusion, Mares draws implications for contemporary democracies. She notes the importance of moving beyond theories with few causal chains—theories that link inequality and democracy, for example—and instead developing causal pathways that link electoral conditions to reforms. Parties and legislators are likely to embrace reforms that equalize the playing field or penalize corrupt parties with monopolies over resources. But reforms can only succeed when these illicit practices are publicized, denounced, and penalized by law. Mares could have delved into the way party-building and programmatic politics change the party system, perhaps by substituting policy competition for illicit strategies. Democratization, particularly the move toward free(r) and fair(er) elections, implies some degree of policy responsiveness that might have affected when and how parties considered electoral reforms.

Protecting the Ballot is a significant contribution to our understanding of democratization, and to the way the electoral environment shapes, and is shaped by, norms about procedural democracy. It is essential reading for anyone concerned with corruption, clientelism, and fraud, both historically and today. Mares brings historical detail and analytical clarity to these debates, building on—and improving—a scholarly tradition that uses history to shed light on contemporary problems. Her account encourages us to look beyond the macro, slow-moving factors that shaped democracy in the long run, and instead to pinpoint the political conditions that propel incremental efforts to modernize and strengthen our democratic institutions.

Settling for Less: Why States Colonize and Why They Stop. By Lachlan McNamee. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2023. 256p. $120.00 cloth, $35.00 paper.
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Lachlan McNamee's short book on settler colonialism, *Settling for Less: Why States Colonize and Why They Stop*, is nothing short of excellent. In just 163 pages, excluding appendices, notes, and such, it gives us the theoretical tools to make sense of one of the macro-political processes that has shaped the contours of the modern world: settler colonialism. Although it is naturally associated with European colonization overseas, the Tibetans in China, the Rohingya of Myanmar, the Kashmiris of India, the Darfuris of Sudan, the Palestinians in Israel, and the Kurds in Iraq can testify that the practice of settler colonialism persists to this day. McNamee,

however, is "cautiously optimistic" that the coercive redistribution of land from Indigenes to settlers, which is settler colonialism, will become obsolete in a not-too-distant future. How so?

The overall argument is as simple as it is compelling. In developing countries, where land is valuable, it is easy enough for governments to convince their citizens to migrate to a contested frontier by offering free land there to settlers. In more developed countries, however, citizens are naturally attracted to the economic activity in urban centers. This reverses the flows of migration from the periphery to the metropole. "The only necessary and sufficient condition for [settler colonialism] is the existence of willing settlers," McNamee tells us (p. 24). Developed countries lose the ability to attract settlement into frontier regions, because economic modernization eventually dries up the well of willing settlers. Tax breaks and infrastructure investments will likely prove ineffective given the countervailing force of urban opportunity. Developed countries have to "pay more for settlers and end up settling for less land" (p. 21). Turning Lenin on his head, McNamee argues that the highest stage of capitalism is not, in fact, colonization: it is decolonization.

Other prominent interpretations of colonialism have emphasized populist nationalism; strategic considerations to defend existing colonies and important trade routes; a social atavism of Europe's precapitalist aristocracy that sought "expansion for the sake of expanding," as Schumpeter would have it; and the erosion of home markets caused by rising inequality in a newly industrialized Europe. Like Hobson and Lenin, proponents of the last view, McNamee focuses on the economic drivers of colonialism, although, of course, his conclusion is almost diametrically opposed to theirs.

Colonizing states are not as unitary as the title might suggests. On the contrary, McNamee argues that the interests of settlers and of the government in the metropole are often opposed. The theoretical argument is structured around a triangular game between governments, settlers, and the Indigenes. Settlers have an almost unavoidable zero-sum conflict of interest with the Indigenous population over land. For the metropolitan government, the Indigenous relation is murkier. A priori, settler colonization is "uneconomical" for governments: there are direct costs of conquest, displacement, or elimination. Later there are also the opportunity costs of foregone production and tax revenue. The metropolitan government would prefer to rule the territory through Indigenous elites in a system of indirect rule or to assimilate the Indigenes into the common national identity through the educational system.

Why, when, and where do governments then opt for the uneconomical strategy of settlement colonization? The timing of state-led colonization is shaped by territorial conflict. When conflict is limited, governments can afford to wait a generation or so for assimilation to work. When territorial conflict has escalated, governments might opt for simply eliminating the Indigenous population. Settlement colonization occurs in between these extremes, in a middle ground of uncertain peace where governments lack the time to assimilate but are in no hurry to eliminate. The geography of state-led colonization is shaped by the location of disloyal ethnic groups, natural resources, and non-natural borders. In politically contested border regions, the settlement of conationals constitutes a credible commitment to defense and potentially deters rivals from staking claims to the territory. The last leg in the theoretical triad is the relationship between governments and settlers. This, as argued, changes with development, modernization, and urbanization.

Lachlan McNamee builds his theory using all kinds of qualitative sources to illustrate and exemplify. Newspaper clippings, parliamentary speeches, official reports, and personal observations from fieldwork are skillfully woven into the overall argument so that even the theory chapter reads like a novel.

The empirical chapters largely follow the trend in modern comparative politics and historical political economy of using original data to provide deep, quantitative explorations of specific cases. Panel data analyses across countries show the general validity of the argument.

Half the quantitative case studies illustrate successful colonization schemes; half show failures. As an example of the former, we learn how Indonesia's colonization of its borderland with Papua New Guinea in the 1960s is consistent with the theory's proposed dual logic of mid-level conflict and resource extraction. As an example of the latter, modernization processes in the early twentieth century drew Australians to the economic activity around urban centers and hampered the government's attempts to colonize Papua New Guinea and the Northern Territory. Australia, obviously, is a crucial case: it is the canonical settler state. As Australia grew richer, it lost the power of colonization.

The same is currently happening in Xianjiang, where the Chinese government is now largely unable to encourage large-scale Han migration to the region. This contrasts with Beijing's relative success in altering the ethnic demography along the Soviet border during the Sino–Soviet split (1959–82). It contrasts also with the mass settlement of ethnic Russians and the expulsion of Chinese, which the Soviet Union successfully orchestrated from the other side of the same border. Needless to say, notable differences between China today and China (and the USSR) in the 1960s are economic development and the resultant pull from urban centers. The well of willing settlers ran dry.

Even if the etymological origins of the word "colonization" might be similar to farmer (presumably making "settler colonialism" a pleonasm, and McNamee uses "colonization" and "settler "colonialism" interchangeably), this is not a book

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about colonization *tout court*. It is a book about a specific form of colonization: the displacement of Indigenous people by settlers and the coercive redistribution of land from the one to the other.

Most of the recent quantitative literature on colonialism in the social sciences has explored the consequences of colonialism, treating it as the cause of contemporary political institutions or economic outcomes. These consequences have been found to vary systematically with the form of colonization: direct rule and settlement colonization are generally associated with a transplantation of institutions, ideas, human capital, and more. McNamee's book is mandatory reading for scholars interested in both the causes and consequences of colonization. Colonial settlement is not randomly distributed, and before we attribute causal significance to specific forms of colonization we need to understand why, when, and where governments and settlers chose the strategy of settler colonization. To that end, *Settling for Less* is indispensable.

Charles Tilly once warned us not to crow too loudly about the death of empires. But Lachlan McNamee's excellent, accessible, and well-written book has given us reason to crow. Slowly but surely, the structural force of modernization works against the strategic goals of empire builders.

Zero Tolerance: Repression and Political Violence on China's New Silk Road. By Philip B. K. Potter and Chen Wang. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2022. 244p. $89.99 cloth, $29.99 paper.
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As China's influence and ambition both grow in the global arena, its mode of authoritarian politics as manifested in both domestic and international dimensions has drawn growing scrutiny from scholars, observers, and policy makers. On the one hand, increasingly sophisticated forms of information control, the rising tide of nationalism, and recent institutional changes are the focus of a growing literature on China's domestic politics. On the other hand, China's ambitious global projects, including the Belt and Road Initiative, exportation of digital authoritarianism, shifts in foreign policies, and challenges to the liberal international order, are being closely watched around the world. Given the heavy-handed domestic state apparatus and being at the forefront of China's competition for global influence, Xinjiang is a perfect place to observe both dimensions of China's authoritarian politics.

Philip B. K. Potter and Chen Wang's new book, *Zero Tolerance*, focuses on authoritarian repression and political violence in Xinjiang, uncovering both the causes of this vicious cycle of repression and violence and their implications for both China and the world. The authors carefully assess the scale of political violence in Xinjiang and identify four phases of violence and repression (chapter 2). They use state media's coverage of violent attacks to examine the regime's moving between suppressing and promptly releasing information in the face of domestic political violence (chapter 3). Chapter 4 analyzes the securitization of Xinjiang and the recent intensification of assimilation and de-extremification efforts. The authors argue that this strategic shift was largely driven by three key factors: frustration with the prior carrot-and-stick approach that failed to deliver absolute stability, domestic challenges caused by economic slowdown and political transitions that led to the regime's shift toward fostering ideological unity for legitimation, and deteriorating international conditions that heightened the regime's fear of foreign interference (pp. 108, 127–40). As China expands its political and economic influence globally, its concerns about regional stability and security prompt it to elevate the role of counterterrorism in its foreign policies, especially along China's New Silk Road. China prioritizes military cooperation in counterterrorism in places with both substantial Chinese investment and a significant risk of militant violence (chapter 5). The authors wrap up their compelling analysis with a gloomy prediction of the path ahead: China is unlikely to cease its excessive measures in Xinjiang, and the international outcry is unlikely to alter the regime's calculus of legitimacy and survival (chapter 6).

Zero Tolerance presents at least two important and broad contributions to the study of ethnic conflict and authoritarian politics through the case of China. First, building on earlier works by specialists on Xinjiang, including Gardner Bovingdon, James A. Millward, and Michael Dillon, more recent research has focused on the plight of the Uyghur people and the securitization of the region (for instance, see James A. Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang*, 2021; and Stefanie Kam and Michael Clarke, "Securitization, Surveillance and 'De-Extremization' in Xinjiang," *International Affairs*, 97, 2021). However, relatively less attention has been focused on the political violence in the region, which is an essential link in the chain of repression, grievance, and violence (pp. 13–16, 132–33). The authors' approach differs from the existing literature by emphasizing the importance of understanding the reality of political violence and how this is linked to the regime's perception of its own interests and the risks to its survival.

The authors use the comprehensive data they collected on Uyghur-initiated political violence in China from 1990 to 2014 to systematically analyze both the relationship between the timing of violence and the international environment facing China (pp. 49–53) and that between violence and securitization (pp. 129–33). They find that militants, attempting to maximize engagement with international audiences and to delegitimize the regime, are